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Pension funds around the world suffered dramatically from fallings stock markets in the 
period 1999-2003. For example, Wilshire associates report in May 2003 that 89% of the 
US S&P 500 defined benefit plans were underfunded at the end of 2002
2. At the end of 
the fiscal year 2003, total underfunding in the US private pension funds exceeded $350 
million. Other countries with well-developed pension industries, such as Canada, the UK 
and several other European countries, show similar statistics. The extent of the damage 
varies by country. The main cause of the problems was a considerable exposure to stocks. 
In particular, in the 90s of the previous century, pension funds around the world switched 
from rather conservative asset allocations towards more exposure to equity. Despite the 
severity  of  the  crises,  media  attention  was  mostly  limited  to  some  coverage  in  the 
financial  press.  Most  beneficiaries  of  pension  funds  are  only  remotely  aware  of  the 
impeding danger for their future pensions.  
 
The pension fund crises attracted a lot of media attention, and several solutions have been 
tried by individual pension funds. Despite the fact that the fall in stock market prices was 
the  major  cause  of  the  crises,  few  funds  choose  to  reduce  the  exposure to  the  stock 
market.  Many plan  sponsors  added additional  funding  to  increase  the  funding  levels, 
although their ability to do so depends of course on their own financial health. In the US, 
the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (2003) reports to have bailed out of several 
pension  funds.  Other  actions  taken  by  the  pension  funds  are  the  reduction  of  future 
pension claims by limiting indexations, changing the mechanism for accruing benefits, 
changing from defined-benefit to defined contribution schemes, and closing the funds for 
new employees. In other words, most effort has been directed to the liabilities rather than 
changing asset allocation policy. For example, in the table 1 we report the average asset 
allocation for pension funds in the Netherlands. As can be seen in this table, the average 
allocation to equity dropped from 41.9% in 2001 to 34.9% in 2002, but increased again to 
38.1% in 2004.  
                                                 
1 The author acknowledges encouragement, support and comments from Henk Bets, Heiko de Boer, Nanne 
Brunia and Henk van Wijk in developing the ideas expressed in this paper. All errors are the responsibility 
of the author. This paper was written during my stay as a visiting associate professor at the Richard H. 
Driehaus Centre of Behavioral Finance, DePaul University, Chicago. 
2 Quoted from Pension Benefits, Vol 12, No. 7. - 2 - 
 
Tabel 1: Pension funds in the Netherlands 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Cash  5,430  4,821  3,543  5,437  4,940  11,551  10,836 
Bonds  181,411  195,825  188,361  206,340  201,739  206,592  206,937 
Equity  105,881  140,806  204,313  190,715  192,924  149,231  184,942 
Real Estate  31,608  35,498  41,535  47,965  49,609  46,564  47,788 
Other investments  8,830  9,803  13,512  13,300  11,565  13,358  26,545 
Total investments  333,160  386,753  451,264  463,757  460,777  427,296  477,048 
Average funding ratio  126  133  139  132  118  101  104 
% underfunded pension 
funds 
    0.4%  0.3%  1.5%  10.2%  4.3% 
 
The response of the pension fund industry to the stock market crises in addition to the 
already existing trend towards defined contribution plans shifted more responsibility and 
risks to the individual. As a result, the risks are now more and more on the shoulders of 
the individual. However, these individuals still have to solve the same problem as the 
defined benefit pension plans: how to invest in such a way to attain a decent level of 
future retirement benefits. Rooij, Kool and Prast (2005) investigated the preferences of a 
sample of 1000 individuals and found that the majority prefers a defined benefit plan over 
a defined contribution plan. In addition, they found that the majority of these individuals 
wants to avoid the responsibility for investment choices. Apparently, investors are aware 
of their limited ability to make decisions in a defined contribution plan. It also hard to 
believe that individuals are better suited for this job than pension fund managers are. 
There  is  a  considerable  literature  on  the  irrational  trading  behavior  of  individual 
investors.  For  example,  Barber  and  Odean  (2002)  report  that  investors  trading  in 
individual securities show an excessive turnover in their portfolios. Furthermore, they 
show that trading has a negative impact on portfolio performance. The 20% investors 
who trade most earn a return of 11.4%, whereas the market returns 17.9%.  
 
In our opinion, pension funds perform a useful role in providing collective pensions for 
individuals. Therefore, we believe that many policy responses after the market crash have 
been  misdirected.  In  particular,  we  believe  that  the  asset  allocation  of  pension  funds 
should  have  been  realigned  with  the  risks  of  the  liability  structure.  Furthermore,  the 
valuation of the pension liabilities should be reconsidered in order to make sure that the 
assumptions  made  in  valuing  the  future  cash  flows  are  matched  with  the  reality  of 
investment  markets. However, our most important suggestion is that the performance 
measurement systems of pension funds should be redesigned in order to focus investment 
managers on the primary objective of pension funds. This should result in the use of a so-
called  liability-driven  benchmark  for  the  performance  and  risk-management  of  the 
investment portfolio, in order to ensure that the investment policy remains focused on 
serving the pension beneficiaries. The primary focus of the pension fund should be on 
providing reliable pension benefits. The reality is that pension funds are trapped between 
the objective of the beneficiaries and that of the plan sponsor. The plan sponsor desires to 
minimize its contributions, which is associated with a lower probability of pensions being 
paid out. The beneficiaries like to have higher pensions, which usually cannot be realized - 3 - 
without  higher  sponsor  contributions.  An  often-used  resolution  to  this  conflict  is  to 
choose an asset portfolio with a higher expected return, which makes it possible to have 
both lower sponsor contributions and higher future expected benefits. Unfortunately, this 
solution results in additional risk for the beneficiaries. Depending on the solvency of the 
sponsor and his willingness to pay, the additional risk is eventually levied on either the 
sponsor  or  the  beneficiaries.  This  can  lead  to  undesirable  circumstances,  where  the 
sponsor  is  not  able  or  willing  to  compensate  deficits  in  the  pension  fund.  In  these 
circumstances, government agencies such as the PBGC may have to bear the losses, or, in 
the absence of such an agency, the pensions have to be lowered.  
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a performance measurement framework that 
supports more reliable pension claims from the perspective of pension beneficiaries. This 
performance measurement framework has two important elements. The first element is 
the  benchmark,  which  is  based  on  cash  flow  matching.  The  second  element  is  a 
performance attribution model, which facilitates analyzing the causes of good and bad 
performance.  
 
This study is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the nature of pension fund 
liabilities  and  the  risk  factors  associated  with  pension  liability  risk.  In  section  3,  we 
discuss the relation between assets and liabilities, and what risk measures can be used to 
reduce the risk of the pension fund. Finally, in section 4 we develop our performance 




2. Pension liabilities 
Although pension funds around the world are structured in a variety of ways, the main 
issue is whether they are defined benefit or defined contribution plans. Pension claims in 
a defined benefit plan are largely determined by the wages earned by the beneficiary and 
the number of years of employment. With a ‘final pay system’, the pension claims are 
based on the wage earned in the last year. However, it is also common to have claims as a 
function  of  past  wages  earned,  such  as  the  average  wage  earned  during  the  years  of 
employment. Pension claims in a defined contribution plan are solely determined by the 
returns  earned  on  the  individual’s  investment  portfolio.  Pension  funds  with  defined 
contribution  plans  levy  the  investment  risks  on  the  individual  plan  beneficiaries. 
Therefore, risk management and asset-liability management are only of indirect concern 
to these plans.  
 
A correct valuation of the liabilities is crucial in managing pension funds. The value of 
the liabilities serves as a benchmark for the level of assets needed to serve the future cash 
flows of the pension fund. The valuation starts with an appropriate estimate of the future 
cash flows resulting from the current promises made to beneficiaries. Next, the present 
value of these cash flows is calculated using a discount rate. This discount rate effectively 
functions as a benchmark for the minimum acceptable return to be achieved on the assets 
(See Sortino, Van der Meer and Plantinga, 1999). If the assets do not yield a sufficient - 4 - 
return,  the  future  pension  benefits  cannot  be  realized  without  further  sponsor 
contributions. Proper valuation of liabilities and accordingly funded pension funds create 
the  potential  for  reliable  pensions,  with  benefits  aligned  to  the  expectations  of  the 
participants.  However,  the  actual  realization  of  reliable  pensions  is  a  matter  of  an 
appropriate investment strategy. In order to keep the focus of portfolio managers on the 
objective of the pension beneficiaries, the investment strategy that gives the best chance 
of realizing the objective has to be embedded in the asset benchmark.  
 
In this article, we focus on the perspective of a pension fund with a defined benefit plan. 
Managing a defined benefit plan is complicated, since it involves risk sharing between 
the beneficiaries and the plan sponsor, and risk sharing between different generations of 
beneficiaries. In order to value these pension liabilities, it is useful to make a distinction 
between nominal liabilities and real liabilities. Nominal liabilities are promises to pay 
future cash flows expressed in nominal terms. Real liabilities are promises to pay future 
cash flows with a fixed purchasing power. Typical pension liabilities are likely to be a 
mix of both nominal liabilities and real liabilities. For practical purposes, the value of 
nominal liabilities is the present value of its future cash flows using nominal risk-free 
discount rates, preferably zero-coupon yields on government securities. The value of real 
liabilities  is  obtained  with  the  use  of  real  yields  on  inflation-linked  zero-coupon 
government bonds.  
 
Pension  liabilities  are  exposed  to  several  sources  of  risks,  such  as  operational  risk, 
unexpected demographic developments, unexpected developments in inflation and real 
interest rates. Interest rate risk is one of the most important risk factors as it affects both 
assets and liabilities. Therefore, it plays an important role in choosing an appropriate 
asset portfolio. Since real pension liabilities and nominal pension liabilities differ with 
respect  to  the  nature  of  the  interest  rate  risk,  it  is  important  to  make  the  distinction 
between these types of liabilities. The real pension liabilities are subject to uncertainty in 
real interest rates, and the nominal pension liabilities are subject to uncertainty in real 
interest rates and future inflation developments.  
 
3. Asset-Liability Modeling 
An asset-liability model (ALM) is a model of the assets and liabilities of a financial 
institution  that  facilitates  decision-making  with  respect  to  asset  allocation  and  the 
properties  of  the  liabilities.  A  crucial  feature  of  these  models  is  the  interdependence 
between asset and liabilities: ALM is an integrated approach to model both assets and 
liabilities. The interdependence can be obtained through different modeling approaches, 
such as surplus models, where the surplus of the pension portfolio is optimized in terms 
of  its  expected  utility  or  some  alternative  value  function.  This  approach  has  been 
advocated by Ezra (1991) and Sharpe and Tint (1990). Since the surplus is usually not 
owned by the plan beneficiaries, the surplus-driven models do not automatically lead to 
strategies that are beneficial for the beneficiaries, unless the funds are endowed with a 
considerable surplus.  
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Reliable  pensions  can  be  obtained  by  using  a  strategy  that  minimizes  the  risk  of 
underfunding.  The  most  obvious  strategy  is  based  on  creating  an  asset  portfolio  that 
replicates the cash flows of the liability portfolio. Although cash flow matching is used in 
practice, practical limitations have motivated many to use duration matching strategies as 
an alternative. In this article, we focus on cash flow matching strategies, although the 
general  idea  can  also  be  obtained  with  a  duration  matching  strategy.  A  cash  flow 
matching  strategy  relies  on the  idea of  buying  assets  that  generate cash  flows at the 
scheduled date of paying liabilities. Such strategies have been promoted and used with 
success  by  life  insurance  companies  in  other  to  cover  their  nominal  liabilities.  For 
pension funds cash flow matching has not been considered as a feasible strategy due to a 
lack  of  index-linked  bonds.  However,  quite  recently  index-linked  bonds  and  their 
potential use for pension funds has gained renewed interest, as the availability of index-
linked bonds has increased in recent years. Several authors have suggested the potential 
benefits of TIPS for pension funds
3.  Critics may argue that the availability of inflation-
linked bonds is only limited and therefore not useful in a feasible investment strategy. In 
addition, they may argue that the inflation index used in the inflation-linked bond may 
differ from that used in the particular pension contract. Although this critique is indeed 
relevant to some extent, more pension funds using matching with real bonds can trigger 
additional supply of inflation-linked bonds by governments. There exists also a growing 
market  of  inflation-linked  swaps  that  can  be  used  as  a  substitute  for  inflation-linked 
bonds. Furthermore, the mismatch between the inflation index used in the bonds and in 
the pension contract is likely to be less severe than the mismatch between the use of a 
nominal bond or equity and the inflation sensitivity of the pension liabilities. 
 
In  order  to  analyze  assets  and  liabilities,  we  follow  Siegel  and  Waring  (2004)  who 
consider the sensitivity of bonds relative to changes in the real rate and in the inflation 
expectations
4. Phoa (1999) finds that using nominal duration for inflation-linked bonds 
gives misleading results. The value of an inflation-linked bond is not affected by changes 
in the expected inflation, since inflation affects the nominal future cash flow to be paid 
out as well as the nominal discount rate. Therefore, in contrast with nominal bonds, the 
sensitivity  of  real  bonds  with  respect  to  inflation  expectations  is  zero. A  meaningful 
approach is to make a distinction between the real rate duration and the inflation duration. 
 
Using Fisher’s decomposition of interest rates, Siegel and Waring (2004) derive duration 
measures that capture the sensitivities for both changes in inflation and real rates, the so-
called ‘dual duration concept’. In the analysis of Siegel and Waring, expected inflation 
and the inflation risk premium are considered as one. The inflation duration of a bond is 
the percentage change in price for a small change in the level of inflation (or the inflation 
risk premium). For a nominal zero coupon bond with maturity T, the inflation duration is 
equal to: 
 
                                                 
3 See for example, Waring (2004). 
4 The concept of dual durations for liabilities has been developed earlier by Goodman and Marshall (1988) 
and for equity by Leibowitz (1986). Laatsch and Klein (2005) also discuss the difference between the 
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where  ￿  is  the inflation  rate  (including  the  inflation  risk  premium),  and i is the  real 
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For an index-linked bond, the inflation duration is equal to 
0 = p D ,                (3) 
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In this analysis, nominal interest rates, real interest rates and inflation expectations are 
independent of the investment horizon. In other words, the term structure of interest rate 
and inflation is flat, and moves in a parallel fashion. In the remainder of this article, we 
will also use this assumption, although for practical purposes, it may be necessary to 
extend the analysis to capture different shapes and movements of the term structure.  
 
We illustrate the importance of the dual duration concept with the following example of 
an imaginary pension fund. This pension fund has an inflation-linked liability over five 
years equal to 1000 dollars in terms of purchasing power at t = 0. The nominal amount to 
be paid out depends on the annualized inflation rate from t = 0 to t = 5, i0,5. The nominal 
cash flow paid out at t = 5 equals 1000*(1+i0,5)
5. The current market value of this liability 
is equal to its present value based on the real rate. In table 2, we present the current 
interest environment for this example. We assume that the current real rate equals 2%, 
expected  inflation  is  also  2%,  and  the  inflation  risk  premium  is  equal  to  1.25%. 
Consequently, the current nominal interest rate must be (1.02*1.02*1.025)-1 = 5.34%. 
Given these assumptions, the present value at t = 0 of the real (indexed) liability equals 
1000/1.02
5  =  905.73.  We  also  consider  a  second  pension  fund,  with  only  nominal 
liabilities. This pension fund has an obligation to pay 1000 at t = 5. The present value of 
this obligation is 1000/1.0534
5 = 770.94. In table 2, we present alternative interest rate 
scenarios and the impact of these scenarios on the value of the liabilities. These scenarios 
show that real rates may move in opposite directions from nominal rates. 
 
Table 2: Present value of real liabilities under different scenarios 
  Current 
parameters 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Real rate  2.00%  3.27%  2.00%  1.00% 
Expected inflation  2.00%  1.00%  1.00%  5.00% 
Inflation risk premium  1.25%  1.00%  0.20%  1.25% 
Nominal rate  5.34%  5.34%  3.23%  7.38% 
Value of real liabilities  905.73  851.60  905.73  951.47 
Value of nominal 
liabilities 
770.94  770.94  853.21  700.60 - 7 - 
 
 
Scenario 1 shows an increase of the real interest rate to 3.27% and a decrease in both 
expected inflation and the inflation risk premium. As a result, the nominal rate and the 
value of the nominal liabilities remain unchanged. From table 2, we observe that this 
scenario  causes  a  fall  of  the  value  of  the  real  liabilities.  Scenario  2  shows  a  fall  in 
nominal interest rates with unchanged real rates. In this scenario, the value of the nominal 
liabilities  increases  relative  to  the  current  situation,  whereas  the  value  of  the  real 
liabilities remains unchanged. Scenario 3 shows a fall in real rates combined with a rise 
in nominal rates. In this scenario, the value of the real and the nominal liabilities move in 
opposite directions.  
 
Modigliani  and  Cohn  (1979)  suggest  that  investors  suffer  from  money  illusion  by 
discounting real cash flows at nominal rates. Cohn, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005) find 
evidence confirming the existence of money illusion among investors. It seems less likely 
that pension fund managers suffer from this explicit form of money illusion. However, it 
is possible that they suffer from a more subtle form of money illusion, where they do 
ignore the difference in duration for real and nominal cash flows. Such an investor may 
try to match the real pension liabilities with nominal assets. In table 3, we consider the 
implications of the asset allocation strategy for an investor with real liabilities using our 
example of the pension fund with a real liability. We assume that our pension fund has a 
funding ratio of 110%, which implies that the value of assets equals 996.30. Next, we 
consider different asset allocation strategies with varying allocations to nominal and real 
bonds. In table 3 we present the value of the surplus given the scenarios presented in 
table 2 for the different asset mixes. 
 
Table 3: The impact of asset allocation on the surplus 




















0%  100%  85.16  -6.0%  90.57  0.0%  95.15  5.0% 
25%  75%  100.04  10.5%  117.15  29.3%  59.84  -33.9% 
50%  50%  114.93  26.9%  143.73  58.7%  24.54  -72.9% 
75%  25%  129.82  43.3%  170.30  88.0%  (10.76)  -111.9% 
100%  0%  144.70  59.8%  196.88  117.4%  (46.07)  -150.9% 
 
As can be seen in this table, the strategy of investing fully in nominal bonds is the most 
disastrous, as it presents the largest possible loss equal to –150.9% of initial surplus. The 
least risky asset mix is that of 100% in real bonds, which has a maximum loss of 6% in 
scenario  1.  Although  this  analysis  is  based  on  a  set  of  rather  ad-hoc  scenarios,  the 
scenarios themselves are realistic in the sense that they can occur in reality. A perhaps 
remarkable observation is that the strategy of fully investing in nominal bonds is the most 
risky strategy. This is remarkable since prior to the 90s of the previous century, many 
pension funds were actually following this strategy.  
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Given  the  different  response  of  real  and  nominal  bonds  to  changes  in  the  real  and 
nominal  interest  rates,  it  is  important  to  capture  these  differences  in  a  performance 
measurement framework. In particular, it is necessary to construct benchmark portfolios 
that account for the difference between real and nominal cash flows. 
 
4. Benchmarks and performance attribution 
In this section, we develop a benchmark based on inflation-linked assets. Furthermore, 
we propose an attribution framework to analyze the performance of the asset manager 
relative to the benchmark. Our model is based on the concept of matching, and is an 
adjusted version of Plantinga and Huygen (2001) that was developed for measuring the 
performance of life-insurance companies. The basis for the benchmark in this model is a 
strategy of cash flow matching, where a part of the asset portfolio is dedicated to tracking 
the value of the liability portfolio (the so-called liability-driven asset portfolio) and a part 
of  the  asset  portfolio  is  invested  in  risky  assets  (the  so-called  surplus-driven  asset 
portfolio). Since life-insurance companies are dominated by nominal liabilities, it was 
sufficient to use only one liability-driven asset portfolio. However, for pension funds, 
which have both nominal and real liabilities, we have to split the liability-driven asset 
portfolio in two parts, the nominal asset portfolio and the real asset portfolio.   
 
The following balance sheet summarizes the assets and liabilities used in our benchmarks 
and performance attribution model: 
 
Assets    Liabilities   
Surplus assets  As  Surplus  S 
Nominal assets  An  Nominal liabilities  Ln 
Real assets  Ar  Real liabilities  Lr 
 
The benchmark for the nominal asset portfolio is a portfolio that consists of nominal zero 
coupon bonds with the same maturity as the nominal liabilities. The benchmark for the 
real asset portfolio consists of real zero coupon bonds with a maturity structure similar to 
that of the liabilities. The benchmark for the surplus-driven assets can be derived from an 
appropriate market index. For example, if pension fund management decides to invest the 
risky assets in a worldwide stock portfolio, the MSCI World Index may be an appropriate 
candidate.  The  surplus  assets  provide  freedom  to  pursue  active  management.  For 
example,  the  surplus  assets  can  be  invested  in  stocks,  real  estate  or  any  other  asset. 
However, it is important to maintain the primacy of the liabilities: risk-taking behavior 
should not endanger the value of the liabilities. If the manager is very active with the 
liability-driven  asset  portfolio,  then  the  risk  budget  for  the  surplus  assets  becomes 
smaller. A risk management framework should be in place that limits the ability of the 
asset manager to engage in a very risky surplus portfolio
5. 
 
The  primary  objective  of  the  liability-driven  asset  portfolio  is  to  match  the  liability 
portfolio as closely as possible. As a secondary objective, the asset manager may attempt 
                                                 
5 See for example, Sharpe, W.F. (2002). - 9 - 
to outguess the market by anticipating movements in stock markets, real interest rates and 
inflation.  In  our  model,  the  asset  manager  can  attain  this  goal  with  three  different 
instruments. First, the manager can deviate the actual allocations to the nominal and the 
real asset portfolios from those implied by the benchmark. The benchmark suggests that 
the allocation should be equal to the market value of the cash flow matched portfolios. 
The second instrument is the maturity management within the nominal and real asset 
portfolios: the manager may choose durations different from those of the liabilities. As a 
result, the surplus return of the pension fund will be subject to interest rate risk. Related 
to the choice of the maturity structure is the choice of the instruments. For example, 
pension funds may choose not to buy real zero-coupon bonds, but rely on derivatives or 
structured products, such as inflation rate swaps that incur some credit risk. The third 
instrument is the choice of the surplus-driven asset portfolio, which can be freely invested 
as long as it is not excessively exposed to risk. 
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where sa is the realized surplus rate of return, ra
s is the realized return on surplus assets, 
ra
n is the realized return on the nominal asset portfolio, ra
r is the realized return on the 
real  asset portfolio,  rl
n  is  the  realized return  on  the  nominal  liabilities,  and  rl
r  is  the 
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Our benchmark is based on perfect cash matching. This implies that the allocation to the 
three asset classes equals As = S, An =Ln, and Ar=Lr. . The benchmark return is defined as: 
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where  rp
n  is  the  return  on  the  portfolio  that  is  cash  flow  matched  with  the  nominal 
liabilities and rp
r is the return on the portfolio that is cash flow matched with the real 
liabilities. The difference between equation (6) and (7) provides the difference between 
the return on the actual portfolio and the benchmark. In order to analyze the causes of 
these differences, we regroup a number of terms. First, we identify the following three 
allocation mismatches: the surplus allocation mismatch, the nominal allocation mismatch, 
and the real allocation mismatch. These mismatches refer to deviations in the size of the 
three portfolios from the benchmark. 
 
The surplus allocation mismatch is defined as: 
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As a result, we are now able to construct the following performance attribution: 
 
























r r r s s d d d + - + + - + + - = - .  (11) 
 
Equation (11) provides useful information regarding the performance of the pension fund, 
and we use it as the basis for performance attribution. Summarizing all the components 
involving  ￿s,  ￿n,  and  ￿r  results  in  one  component  for  the  allocation  mismatches. 
Consequently,  we  identify  the  following  four  components  that  determine  the  excess 
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The  first  component  is  the  excess  return  on  surplus  assets.  The  second  component 
represents  the  difference  between  the  actual  portfolio  of  nominal  assets  and  its 
benchmark. The difference is multiplied by the ratio of nominal assets over surplus. This 
component corresponds is caused by the maturity mismatch between nominal bonds and 
liabilities. The third component represents the difference between the actual portfolio of 
real assts and its benchmark, multiplied by the ratio of real assets over surplus. This 
component is the result to the duration mismatch between real liabilities and bonds. The 
fourth component is the sum of the allocation mismatches. 
 
Consider the following example of a pension fund with a nominal obligation of 1,000,000 
due in 30 years and a real obligation of 1,000,000 in 30 years. The real obligation is 
expressed in terms of purchasing power at t=0. The nominal assets are invested in zero 
coupon  bonds  yielding  a  cash  flow  of  1,050,000  in  year  20,  and  the  real  assets  are 
invested in zero coupon bonds yielding a cash flow of 150,000 (expressed in terms of - 11 - 
purchasing power at t=0) in year 5. In order to value these cash flows, the levels of the 
real interest rate, the expected inflation and the inflation risk premium are given in table 
4. 
Table 4: Interest parameters for example 
  t=0  t=1 
Real interest rate  0.75%  0.40% 
Expected inflation  2.00%  3.25% 
Inflation risk premium  0.50%  0.50% 
Nominal interest rate  3.25%  4.15% 
 
Based on the data in table 4, we calculate the balance sheet of our pension fund at t = 0 
and t = 1. The results are presented in table 5. In order to keep the example simple, we 
assume that the projected cash flows from the liabilities remain constant. In other words, 
there are no credit risk events or deviations from the original mortality assumptions. As a 
result, the return on each of the two liability categories is the same as the return on the 
cash flow matched benchmark portfolio. The value of the stock portfolio at t = 1, is based 
on an assumed stock return of 2.09%. In this example, we focus on the performance of 
the existing portfolio of assets and liabilities, and we ignore new pension fund liabilities 
created during the year. As we can observe from table 5, the surplus of the pension fund 
decreased considerably, result in a negative surplus return of –76.6%. 
 
Table 5: Example of a pension fund balance sheet 
Panel a: Balance sheet at t=0 
    Liabilities   














Panel b: Balance sheet at t=1 
Assets    Liabilities   














Panel c: Returns 
Assets    Benchmark/liabilities   














 - 12 - 
From panel c in table 5, we observe that the liabilities have risen in value, whereas the 
asset portfolios that supposed to have matched the liabilities decreased in values. These 
results suggest that a considerable mismatch existed between assets and liabilities. In 
order to attribute the negative surplus return to specific causes, we use the performance 
attribution proposed in equation (11). We have calculated the leverage ratios as well as 
the allocation mismatches identified in equation (8) to (10) in the following table:  
 
  Leverage    Allocation mismatch 
Surplus  1    Nominal  +1.88 
Nominal liabilities  4.21    Real  -7.19 
Real liabilities  8.78    Surplus  +5.31 
 
As  a  result,  we  can  now  easily  calculate  all  the  components  of  the  liability-driven 
performance attribution for our pension fund. The results of this calculation are presented 
in table 6: 
 
Table 6: Liability-driven performance measurement for a pension fund 
 
    Return 
I  Excess performance on surplus assets  0.00% 
II  Nominal duration mismatch  30.62% 
III  Real duration mismatch  -81.49% 
IV  Allocation mismatch  -27.79% 
  Surplus return  -76.58% 
 
Since  we  assumed  that  the  surplus-driven  assets  were  invested  according  to  the 
benchmark, the contribution of the first component equals 0%. The second component 
has  a  positive  contribution  to  surplus  return,  indicating  that  the  decision  to  have  the 
nominal asset duration shorter than the liability duration was a good decision given the 
increase in nominal interest rates. On the other hand, the negative return for the third 
component suggests that the decision to have a lower duration for the real assets than for 
the liabilities turns out to be disastrous given the fall in real interest rates. The attribution 
makes  clear  what  the  impact  of  each  decision  is.  In  this  example,  the  real  duration 
mismatch had the largest impact on the negative surplus return. 
 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
Triggered by bad stock market performance, defined benefit pension plans experienced 
serious difficulties at the beginning of this new century. In our opinion, the stock market 
performance contributed only partly to this situation. More important is the poor choice 
of benchmarks used in risk and performance control. Since pension funds are designated 
institutions for providing reliable pension to individuals, the reliability of these pensions 
should be the primary objective of the pension fund. However, in practice, pension funds 
have to balance the objective of the level and reliability of the pension with that of the - 13 - 
costs of the pension. The benchmark in this paper implies a clear choice for the reliability 
of the future pension claims. This choice does not imply that we ignore the costs for the 
sponsor of the pension plan. However, we believe that the desire for lowering the costs 
should be honored by lowering the pension benefits beforehand, rather than by means of 
a lower probability of being able to service the promised claims. The latter would cause 
high costs for the beneficiaries afterwards, which incur unexpected wealth losses if asset 
markets perform badly.  
 
In this paper, we emphasized the importance of making a distinction between nominal 
and real liabilities for pension funds. The investment strategy of a pension fund should be 
based on assets that matching the risk characteristics with its liabilities. We propose a 
portfolio of assets that is cash flow matched with the real liabilities and one matched with 
the nominal liabilities. In addition, we have a third portfolio, which is the portfolio of 
surplus assets that can be freely invested. The benchmark portfolio should be based on 
this strategy. In reality, this strategy may be difficult to attain due to a lack of index-
linked  assets. Nevertheless, in the near  future,  the growing supply of inflation-linked 
products may be able to meet this demand. Furthermore, creating sufficient surplus-assets 
may help to cushion the risks from unexpected inflation developments. 
 
In  section  4,  we  proposed  a  performance  attribution  model  based  on  the  cash  flow 
matched benchmark portfolios. This attribution model facilitates the evaluation of the 
investment performance starting from the characteristics of the liabilities. It enables the 
user to identify the performance of the most risky decisions, and in particular of the 
mismatch of the  real and nominal duration between assets and liabilities.  Given the 
restriction on the availability of index-linked assets, it is possible to adjust this framework 
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